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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
After many months delay due to Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) leaks in the aft
compartment and 17" LH2 umbilical disconnect system, Columbia was launched from
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch complex 39B at 1:49 a.m. Eastern Standard Time
(EST) on December 2, 1990. Four launch scrubs, and a number of mini-tanking tests
performed to troubleshoot the Hydrogen (H2) leaks, took place between the initial
launch attempt in May of 1990 and the successful tanking test on October 30, 1990 that
cleared Columbia for the December 2, 1990 launch. Both the Orbiter and External
Tank (ET) 17" disconnects were replaced with new units prior to the final tanking test
and the December launch. It is believed that crushed prevalve detent cover seals were
the primary leak path that resulted in the high aft compartment H2 concentrations
observed during the scrubbed launch attempts and the tanking tests.
Planned mission duration was shortened one day due to forecasted inclement
weather at the primary landing site, Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California.
Deorbit took place on orbit 141, with a landing on EAFB concrete runway 22 at 12:54
a.m. EST on December 10, 1990.
Based on the limited number and type of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) encountered,
the Space Shuttle operated satisfactorily throughout the STS-35 mission. However, only
about 75% of the mission's planned scientific objectives were accomplished due to
spacelab computer equipment failures.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSB) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and
Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space
Shuttle flight. The intent of the MSB is to document safety risk factors that represent a
change, or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control
Board (PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk
factors impacting STS-35 flight were also documented prior to the STS-35 Flight
Readiness Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and the STS-35 Launch Minus Two Day (L-2)
Review (L-2 Edition). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance against safety
risk factors identified in the previous MSB editions for this mission.
The MSB is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSB is issued in
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The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSB) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ) and the Space Shuttle Program Director with the
NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to the
Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1.2 Scope ,
This report addresses STS-35 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and
factors that were unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSB are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I
for discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSB
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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13 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 - Provides a summary description of the STS-35 mission,
including launch data, crew size, mission duration, launch and
landing sites, and other mission- and payload-related
information.
Section 3 - Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-35 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-35
flight.
Section 4 - Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-35.
Section 5 - Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-38 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight.
Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-32
mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle (OV-102).
Section 7 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-35
mission. Those IFAs that are considered to represent a safety
risk will be addressed in the MSE for the next Space Shuttle
flight.
Section 8 - Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains (in notebook
format) presentation data, white papers, and other
documentation. These data were used to support the
resolution rationale or retention of open status for each item
discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
1-2 STS-35 Postflight Edition
SECTION 2
STS-35 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of the STS-35 Mission
After many months delay due to Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) leakage in the aft
compartment and 17" LH2 umbilical disconnect system, Columbia was launched from
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch complex 39B at 1:49 a.m. Eastern Standard Time
(EST) on December 2, 1990. Four launch scrubs, and a number of mini-tanking tests
performed to troubleshoot the Hydrogen (H2) leaks, took place between the initial
launch attempt in May of 1990 and the successful tanking test on October 30, 1990 that
cleared Columbia for the December 2, 1990 launch. Both the Orbiter and External
Tank (ET) 17" disconnects were replaced with new units prior to the final tanking test
and the December launch. Section 4, Integration 8 contains a detailed description of
the H2 leakage encountered during the launch scrubs and tanking tests, and the
investigations conducted to isolation the cause and to successfully resolve the H2 leaks.
It is believed that crushed prevalve detent cover seals were the primary leak path that
resulted in the high aft compartment H2 concentrations observed during the launch
attempts and tanking tests.
Postlaunch inspection of the Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) and the pad found
no flight hardware or Thermal Protection System (TPS) materials, with the exception of
one Orbiter base shield Q-felt plug. These plugs had also been found on previous
flights. South Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Holddown Post (HDP) erosion was normal.
Shim material on HDP #1, #2, and #6 was intact, but debonded to various degrees.
Shim material on HDP #5 was also debonded and partially missing from 2 sidewalls. A
total of 5 pieces of Instafoam were recovered; the largest piece measured 4" x 3" x 2".
In addition, an 8" x 10" x 4" curved section of scorched foam was found on the pad
apron.
Based on the limited number and type of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) encountered,
the Space Shuttle operated satisfactorily throughout the STS-35 mission. The more
significant anomalies observed are summarized below.
During egress and prelaunch operations, the pilot attempted to make seat
adjustments. The pilot seat failed to drive down. (This is a repeat of an STS-32 anomaly
and has been a unique OV-102 problem.) However, the seat worked properly on orbit.
The down-limit switch was replaced during STS-35 turnaround, and troubleshooting will
be performed at KSC.
2-1 STS-35 Postflight Edition
During ascent, Water Spray Boiler (WSB) #3A did not initiate spray cooling until
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) #3 lube oil return temperature reached 277 °F. WSB
cooling operations should begin at 250 8F. Preliminary analysis indicated the presence of
wax in the APU #3 lube oil that may have caused the spray bar to freeze. A hot oil
flush will be performed during the STS-40/OV-102 turnaround process, and WSB #3A
will be tested. During both ascent and entry, indication of a large amount of wax was
also noted in the APU #2 lube oil system. APU #2 is scheduled to be replaced during
STS-40/OV-102 turnaround due to the Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM) life-limit
criteria.
About 9 hours into the flight, the astronauts smelled a burning odor coming from 1
of the 2 Spacelab control Dedicated Display Units (DDUs) on the flight deck. The unit
was promptly shutdown, and the backup unit was used. However, on the morning of
December 6, the second Spacelab DDU shut itself off, and a burning odor was again
noticed. Later attempts to reactivate the primary DDU were unsuccessful. The crew's
only means of communication with the Astro-1 payload was by the DDUs. A
workaround was devised whereby the astronauts used their joystick to perform final
targeting while the Huntsville scientists coached the astronauts via radio to refine the
Astro-1 instruments alignment on the target. The procedure was cumbersome, but it
enabled the acquisition of an appreciable amount of important scientific data.
On orbit, gradual degradation of the waste water dump rate was noted during the
first 3 dump cycles, and the line was completely blocked on the fourth dump.
Troubleshooting found that the waste water dump line polyurethane filter material had
deteriorated due to age and caused the blockage. The filters were manufactured in 1980
and were found still in stock. The polyurethane material deteriorates badly after
approximately 8 years.
The planned mission duration was shortened one day due to forecasted inclement
weather at the primary landing site, Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California.
Deorbit took place on orbit 141, with a landing on EAFB concrete runway 22 at 12:54
a.m. EST on December 10, 1990. Only about 75% of the mission's planned scientific
objectives were accomplished due to Spacelab computer equipment failures.
Postflight inspection of OV-102 found a 24" piece of the environmental material
hanging loose at the top of the right Payload Bay Door (PLBD). No damage internal to
the payload bay was apparent. An investigation into the cause of this STS-35/OV-102
anomaly is continuing. On STS-41/OV-103, a 6" splice segment of the PLBD-to-aft
bulkhead environmental seal was found debonded; the cause was determined to be
insufficient application of the seal (bad etching and bonding).
The Orbiter/ET Liquid Oxygen (LO2) aft attach/separation hole plugger did not
complete its stroke. One of the 2 pyros was jammed between the plugger and the rim
of the hole. The other pyro device was not found and may have escaped. The ET door
latched normally, and no debris was found on the runway after the ET doors were open.
The ET doors may be recycled in flight in the event that closing or latching is
obstructed. Similar hole plugger failures occurred on STS-29 and STS-34.
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During postflight inspection of the left Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) nozzle joint #3,
a 1.5" gas path was observed through a Room Temperature Vulcanizing (RTV) void at
195" of the Carbon Cloth Phenolic (CCP). Surface heating effects and sooting resulted.
However, there was no blowby erosion or heat effects to the primary O-ring, and no
metal nozzle components were affected. The RTV contributes only as a thermal barrier
and is not considered a seal in the nozzle joints. This was the first occurrence of heat-
affected CCP in nozzle joint #3. However, similar effects were seen in joint #2 (nose
inlet bearing/cowl) of STS-36, QM-7, and PVM-1; no O-ring heat effects resulted.
Thiokol plans to conduct an aero/thermal analysis of nozzle joint #3 to determine the
gas volume and flow characteristics associated with this STS-35 anomaly.
During review of STS-35 ET photographs taken after separation, 11 TPS divots
from 7" to 10" in diameter were observed. All were located in the intertank-to-hydrogen
flange. The divots seen on STS-35 were the first experienced since STS-28. Photograph
review by the Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC) determined that the divots did not
expose ET metal. Worst-case analysis performed by MMC indicated that bare tank
metal as seen on STS-35 would not result in structural or thermal problems.
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22 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: December 2, 1990
• Launch Time: 1:49 a.m. EST
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39B
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Shuttle Landing Facility
• TAL Site: Banjul, The Gambia
• Alternate TAL Site: Ben Guerir, Morocco
• Inclination: 28.45 Degrees
• Altitude: 190 Nautical Miles, Circular Orbit
• Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Concrete Runway 22
• Landing Date: December 10, 1990
• Landing Time: 12:54 a.m. EST
• Mission Duration: 8 Days, 23 Hours, 5 Minutes
• Crew Size: 7
• Obiter: OV-102 (11) Columbia
• PRSD Tank Sets: 5 (Extended Duration Obiter)
SSMEs: (1) #2024, (2) #2012, (3) #2028
ET: ET-35
SRBs: BI-038
SRMs: RSRM Flight Set #11
MLP: MLP #3









































* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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23 Partially Fixed Orifice Flow Control Valves
STS-35/OV-102 was the third Space Shuttle to fly with partially fixed orifice
Gaseous Oxygen (GO2) Flow Control Valves (FCVs). The current active GO2 FCVs used
in the External Tank (ET) Liquid Oxygen (LO2) tank pressurization system will be
replaced by Main Propulsion System (MPS) GO2 fixed orifices. The GO2 FCVs are used
to return gas from the Main Engines back to the ET to maintain ullage pressure. The
fixed orifice was approved for Space Shuttle fleet implementation pending operational
assessment and performance verification [Program Requirements Control Board
Document (PRCBD) S50509R2]. Approval was based on results of the feasibility
assessment performed by Space Shuttle Engineering/Level n and the supporting
contributions of the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) ET Project. Incorporation of
the fixed orifice hardware and procedures into the MPS eliminates some of the
Criticality (Crit) 1 and 1R failure modes associated with the current FCVs which include
the valves, the associated electronics, and the pressure-sensing transducers.
Flight tests with the FCVs shimmed for intermediate flow rates will be used to
verify the analytical model and the final orifice size selection. The FCV stroke between
high-flow and low-flow positions will be gradually reduced over the course of 3 flights
until the valves are fixed in one position. The ET GO2 vent/relief valve pressure was
increased from 24 pounds per square inch gage (psig) to 31 psig on STS-35 by replacing
the spherical spring sensing assembly. This reduced the minimum ullage pressure from
16.0 psig to 14.2 psig, reducing 4 Crit 1R failure modes to Crit 3, and eliminating the
effect of 15 other failure modes. The 31-psig GO2 vent/relief valve was test qualified.
The schedule leading to the implementation of fixed FCVs is as follows:
Flight Vehicle High Flow Low Flow
STS-31 OV-103 100% 42%
STS-41 OV-103 Step 1 93% 55%
STS-38 OV-104 Step 2 85% 66%
STS-35 OV-102 Step 1 93% 55%
TBD TBD Fixed 78% 78%
The first use of shimmed FCVs flew on STS-41/OV-103. Postflight data analysis -
indicated that the partially fixed orifices worked well, with no anomalies.
STS-35 was the third of the series of flights with partially fixed orifices that will
lead to implementation of a fixed orifice FCV. OV-105 hardware shimmed to the
Step 1 configuration was installed on OV-102 for STS-35. The current selection for the
final fixed setting is at 78% flow; however, this value is subject to review and change in
accordance with the test results from the previous flights with partially-shimmed FCVs.
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2.4 Landing Site Priorities
The Astro-1 and Broad Band X-Ray Telescope (BBXRT) were not deployed from
the Payload Bay; they remained with and returned to Earth with the Orbiter vehicle.
Nominal End-of-Mission (NEOM) landing weight for STS-35 was 226,461 pounds (Ib);
the Center of Gravity (CG) was 1081.1". The landing weight and CG for STS-35 Abort
Once Around (AOA) were 229,901 Ib and 1079.3", respectively. Landing on the
Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) lakebed under heavy weight/forward CG conditions
can result in nose gear design loads being exceeded. For both STS-32 and STS-31
(heavy weight, forward CG missions), the runway priorities were changed to place EAFB
concrete runway ahead of the lakebed.
Due to the high derotation rates for landing on the EAFB lakebed, calculated
STS-35 Nose Landing Gear (NLG) slapdown loads for a lakebed landing exceeded the
nose gear certified design load limit of 90,000 Ib. For a nose gear load above 90,000 Ib,
there is a possibility of structural damage and a requirement for a detailed postflight
landing gear inspection. Major structural damage to the Orbiter can be expected if the
NLG load exceeds 111,000 Ib. Therefore, the following landing site priorities were





2.5 17" Disconnect Hydrogen Purge.
A high flow rate Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2) system was under consideration for use
on STS-35 to purge Hydrogen (H2) leakage from the 17" disconnect area. An initial
design was presented at a Final Design Review meeting at Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
on August 20, 1990. There were many unanswered safety-related questions (e.g. acoustic
levels, vibration characteristics, foreign object damage, oxygen concentration effects,
welding at the pad, etc.). Headquarters Safety, in looking at the proposed purge system,
recognized the potential utility but believed that implementation should not be rushed
due to the many safety-related questions and the need for satisfactory review by the
responsible Space Shuttle elements. Subsequent to the STS-35 Delta Flight Readiness
Review on August 20, 1990, the Space Shuttle Program decided not to implement this
purge system for the STS-35 launch due to the extremely tight schedule conditions. The
purge system will be available for use on subsequent Shuttle launches, starting with the
next flight - STS-39. Details of the design and application of this GN2 purge system will
be addressed in the STS-39 Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report.
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2.6 External Tank Tanking Lightning Constraint
A change to the electrical storm activity constraint for ET tanking was in effect for
STS-35. For the previous flight, STS-38, the requirement was verification that no more
than a 20% probability existed for potential electrical activity within 5 miles of the
launch pad during the first 4 hours (hr) of ET tanking. For STS-35, the first 4 hr of ET
tanking condition was reduced to the first hour of ET tanking. This change was
promulgated by Requirements Change Notice (RCN) S59684 approved by the August 2,
1990 Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB).
The rationale behind this change was:
• Present pad lightning protection is adequate:
Lightning masts (pad and ET)
Catenary system
Ground systems incorporate protection.
• Prediction accuracy has been unproved for the first hour of tanking.
This change will provide increased assurance that tanking can be accomplished




• Hopkins Ultraviolet Telescope (HUT)
• Ultraviolet Imaging Telescope (UIT)
• Wisconsin Ultraviolet Photo-Polarimeter Experiment (WUPPE)
Broad Band X-Ray Telescope (BBXRT)
Middeck:
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment (SAREX)
Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) Calibration Test
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2.8 Astro-1 Description.
The Astro-1 mission objective was to conduct a coordinated study of a large
variety of astrophysically important celestial sources in the ultraviolet and x-ray
wavelength regions. Astro-1 was the first of a series of missions that will make precise
measurements of objects such as planets, stars, and galaxies in relatively small fields of
view. Observations emphasized hot and energetic sources which are some of the most
dynamic objects in the universe. A prime target was supernova SN1987A.
The Astro-1 mission operated a complement of 3 experiments and their associated
equipment (Astro-Spacelab) in addition to a related but unique experiment, the Broad
Band X-Ray Telescope (BBXRT), to make precise measurements of astronomical
objects for obtaining scientific data. The 3 Astro-1 Spacelab experiments were the
Wisconsin Ultraviolet Photo-Polarimeter Experiment (WUPPE), the Ultraviolet Imaging
Telescope (UTT), and the Hopkins Ultraviolet Telescope (HUT). The Astro-1 Spacelab
payload utilized the Spacelab Instrument Pointing System (IPS) that was installed on a
Spacelab 2-pallet train configuration in the payload bay. The BBXRT was mounted on
a special carrier that was integrated directly into the Orbiter payload bay, and utilized
the Two-Axis Pointing System (TAPS). The integrated payload consisted of Mission-
Peculiar Equipment (MPE), Spacelab equipment, and the 4 experiments.
The Spacelab experiments and supporting equipment were attached to the IPS
through a cruciform to enable pointing and alignment for stellar observations. The star
tracker, which supported the IPS, was also mounted on the cruciform. MPE required to
integrate, support, and align these 3 experiments included the cruciform, a Payload
Support Strut Assembly (PSSA), an Integrated Radiator System (IRS), Multi-layer
Insulation (MLI), an linage Motion Compensation System (IMCS), instrument mounting
provisions on the cruciform, electrical cables, and other equipment. Spacelab-provided
equipment consisted of the IPS with Optical Sensor Package (OSP), pallet structure and
pallet-mounted equipment, the Payload Retention Latch Assembly (PRLA), actuators
and controls, Igloo structure and Igloo-mounted equipment, Aft Flight Deck (AFD)-
mounted equipment, Subsystem Mounting Structure, an Environmental Control
Subsystem, an Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS), and a Command and Data
Management System (CDMS).
The purpose of the 4 Astro-1 mission experiments is briefly described below.
• HUT studied faint astronomical objects such as quasars, active galactic nuclei,
and supernova remnants in the little-explored ultraviolet range below 1200
Angstroms.
• WUPPE measured the strength and polarization of ultraviolet light from
celestial objects in our galaxy and beyond, such as hot stars, galactic nuclei,
and quasars. Polarized light provides information about the physical
conditions at the radiation source and the interstellar dust through which it
travels enroute to Earth.
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UIT acquired images of faint objects in broad ultraviolet bands in the
wavelength range from 1200 to 3200 Angstroms. It also investigated the
present stellar content and history of star formation in the galaxies, the
nature of spiral structures, and non-thermal sources in galaxies.
BBXRT studied various targets, including active galaxies, clusters of galaxies,
supernova remnants, and stars. It directly measured the amount of energy in
electron-volts of each X-ray detected. BBXRT was a latecomer to the
Astro-1 mission. BBXRT was added to the STS-35 payload after a
supernova erupted within the large Magellanic Cloud in February 1987 to
identify the chemical elements created by this explosion and to provide a
better understanding of the processes that create so-called "soft" x-rays.
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-35 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-35 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, and 6), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-35 flight (see Section 7). The list
indicates the section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item
is addressed, the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description
of the item, and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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ITEM
Section 4: Resolved STS-35 Safety Risk Factors
COMMENT




A single blowhole through the igniter
joint putty was experienced on both
STS-35 SRMs, and there was damage to
the cadmium plating and sooting. There
was no damage to the Gask-O-Seal
elastomer. Because this was an expected
event, no Inflight Anomaly was assigned.
A blowhole was found in the STS-31
right SRM adapter-to-forward dome
(outer) joint putty, with no soot past the
seals. Soot was noted on the outer
gasket retainer Inside Diameter (ID)
edge. Soot was also found on the inner
igniter gasket retainer Outside Diameter
(OD) edge and aft face of the full
circumference. The cadmium plating
was corroded on the igniter inner gasket
retainer aft face and OD edge. Minor
pitting with a maximum depth of 2 mils
was also observed. A blowhole was also
found on the STS-31 left SRM. Putty
blowholes were also experienced on
STS-41 and STS-38 SRM igniter joints.
These occurrences were within the SRM
experience base. It is believed that the
change in the putty layup procedure, and
reduction of putty used to alleviate the
problem, led to the increased incidence
of blowholes.
A redesign effort on the igniter-to-dome
joint is in work to delete the joint putty.
An investigation team is working on
changing the gasket retainer material
from cadmium-plated steel to stainless
steel. The SRM Project Office is
investigating a design change to remove
cadmium plating from the Gask-O-Seal.
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ITEM - COMMENT
Section 4; Resolved STS-35 Safety Risk Factors
SRM 6 Aft dome factory joint Aft dome factory joint internal insulation
internal insulation voids. verification was performed on all aft
SRM segments using ultrasonic
inspection techniques. On the STS-40
Right-Hand (RH) aft segment, ultrasonic
inspection identified insulation voids.
The aft dome factory joint was x-rayed;
14 voids were discovered. This was the
first time that the x-ray inspection
technique was employed to verify
insulation integrity. Nine additional
SRM aft segments were x-rayed (all
motors subsequent to STS-40), and
similar internal insulation voids were
found. The concern was the effect the
voids would have on maintaining the
required 2.0 erosion safety factor in the
aft dome factory joint insulation.
Because of these findings, aft dome
factory joints from STS-36 and STS-31
SRMs were dissected. Similar insulation
voids were identified. It was
determined, however, that these SRMs,
and others based on visual postflight
inspections, met the erosion safety
factor. Postfire insulation samples were
taken from all SRMs. These samples
had small, entrapped air voids.
STS-35 SRM aft dome factory joints
have not yet been dissected to inspect
for insulation voids. A terminated
blowhole was found in the polysulfide
insulation on the RH nozzle-to-case
joint. This was the first occurrence in a
flight motor but was not unexpected,
because of ground test experience.
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ITEM
Section 5: STS-38 Inflight Anomalies
Orbiter 1 Water Spray Boiler (WSB)
#2 did not cool Auxiliary
Power Unit (APU) lube oil




WSB #3 did not initiate cooling of APU
lube oil at the required temperature on
STS-35. This anomaly was attributed to
the presence of wax in the lube oil
(instead of a problem with the APU
controller as experienced on STS-38).
(See Section 7, Orbiter 5 for further
details.)
(IFANo. STS-35-17)
Orbiter 7 Thruster R1U showed low
Chamber Pressure (Pc).
IFANo. STS-38-07
Thruster R5D failed "off1 indicating low
Pcon STS-35, and was deselected by
Redundancy Management (RM).
Investigation by the crew determined
that helium was present in the crossfeed
line of R5D. This condition is indicative
of bubbles in the feedline. Manual
firing of the thruster restored RSD to
operational status. (See Section 7,
Orbiter 8 for further details.)
(IFANo. STS-35-20)
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ITEM
Section 6; STS-32 Inflight Anomalies




APUs #2 and #3 had indications of wax
in the lubrication oil on STS-35. APU
#2 will be removed and replaced due to
life-limit constraints. APU #3 as well as
WSB #2 and #3 will require a hot oil
flush to remove the wax. (See Section 7,
Orbiter 5 and 7 for further details.)





and "A" water bypass.
IFANo. STS-32-07A
STS-32-07B
A small amount of water was found near
the air outlet of humidity separator "B"
on STS-35 Flight Day (FD) 6. It was
decided to allow the water to air dry.
Followup inspections found no
additional water for the remainder of
the mission.
Orbiter 11 Waste water dump
line/nozzle blockage.
IFANo. STS-32-21
The waste water dump function on
STS-35 degraded to the point of failure.
Repeated attempts to clear the line were
unsuccessful. Alternate methods for
storing waste water were used in order
to continue the mission. Waste tank
offload into the Contingency Water
Container (CWC) and urine collection
devices was required for the remainder
of the mission. Troubleshooting found
that the waste water dump line filter had
deteriorated and was the root cause of
the line blockage. A decision was made
to manifest additional CWCs on all
flights. (See Section 7, Orbiter 2 for
further details.)
(IFANo. STS-35-05)
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WSB #3 operations on controller "A" on
STS-35 did not initiate lube oil cooling
as required at 250 *F. This problem was
attributed to the presence of wax in the
lube oil. During reentry operations,
WSB #3, while under the control of
controller "A", was reported to be
overcooling the lube oil. (See Section 7,
Orbiter 5 for further details.)
(IFANo. STS-35-17)
Orbiter 15 RH stop bolt was found
slightly deformed on the
STS-32 centering ring of




Postflight inspection of STS-35/OV-102
found the RH stop bolt bent
approximately 5° from center. Damage
was worse than that seen on STS-32 and
STS-38, but not as bad as experienced
on STS-34. The bolt was removed and
sent to the vendor for analysis. (See
Section 7, Orbiter 10 for further details.)
(IFANo. STS-35-22)
Orbiter 16 Pilot seat down drive motor
did not operate.
IFANo. STS-32-27
The pilot seat down limit switch failed
to allow the seat to be driven down on
STS-35. The seat motor and limit switch
will be investigated by the vendor. (See
Section 7, Orbiter 11 for further details.)
(IFANo. STS-35-23)
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ITEM
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SSME 1 Main Combustion Chamber
(MCC) aft end debond
found on engine #2022.
IFANo. STS-32-ME-01
COMMENT
Postflight ultrasonic inspection of STS-35
engine #2024, MCC #2013, found a
debond less than 3/64" in diameter.
This debond was considered to be within
acceptable limits, and no action was
taken.
ET1 Review of the ET
separation photos from
STS-32 showed 4 Spray-On
Foam Insulation (SOFI)
divots in the bipod area.
IFANo. STS-32-T-01
STS-35 ET separation photos illustrated
11 circular Thermal Protection System
(TPS) divots in the intertank-to-
hydrogen flange area. Divots ranged
from 7" to 10" in diameter (estimates).
(See Section 7, ET 1 for further details.)
(IFANo. STS-35-T-01)
MCC 1 State vector uplink incident.
IFANo. STS-32-MOD-01
No uplink errors were reported on
STS-35. There was, however, an error
in a patch to the Backup Flight System
(BFS) software prior to launch. Because
of the relocation of STS-35 to pad B for
launch, launch pad locational data was
required to be updated in both the
Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS) and BFS. During ascent, a
difference of 143 feet was witnessed in
the positional data sent from the BFS
and PASS. Post-ascent evaluation of
telemetry data identified an error in the
sixth digit of the longitude string of the
BFS patch. (See Section 7, Integration 1
for further details.)
(IFANo. STS-35-I-01)
3-7 STS-35 Postflight Edition
SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-35 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a summary of the safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-35. These items were reviewed by the NASA safety community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to rationale for flight is based on findings
resulting from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP), Prelaunch Assessment Review
(PAR), and Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) evaluations (or other special
panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety assessment arrived at in accordance with
actions taken, efforts conducted, and tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve
each specific safety risk factor.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the risk factor title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
risk factor, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
4-1 STS-35 Postflight Edition
The following risk factors contained in this section represent a low-to-moderate
increase in risk above the Level I approved Hazard Baseline risk. The NASA safety









Difference between the Primary Avionics Software System
and Backup Flight System could lead to recontact between
the Orbiter and External Tank after separation.
Liquid Oxygen fill and drain valve closure in the event of
power loss in terminal sequence.
OV-102 Engine Interface Unit Power-On Reset anomaly.
Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Generator Valve Module issue.
OV-102 Freon Coolant Loop flow rate degradation.
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump Serial Number #4405R1
liftoff seal anomaly during a 10,000-second certification run.
STS-31 right Solid Rocket Motor igniter adapter-to-forward
dome joint putty blowhole.
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SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS-35 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/ RISK
SEQ. NO. FACTOR PAGE
INTEGRATION
1 Difference between the Primary Avionics Software System and 4-6
Backup Flight System could lead to recontact between the Orbiter
and External Tank after separation.
2 OV-102 Main Propulsion System contamination. 4-7
3 Solid Rocket Booster Rate Gyro Assembly workmanship and 4-9
inspection discrepancies.
4 Orbiter/External Tank (OV-102/ET-35) misalignment issue. 4-10
5 Liquid Oxygen T-0 umbilical foot receptacle 1/4" bolt problem. 4-14
6 OV-105 Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve broken poppet. 4-15
7 Liquid Oxygen fill and drain valve closure in the event of power loss 4-16
in terminal sequence.
8 Liquid Hydrogen leaks on STS-35/OV-102 and STS-38/OV-104. 4-18
9 Holddown Post cracks. '4-26
ORBITER
1 Main Landing Gear uplock hook deformation. 4-28
2 Main Landing Gear oversize uplock fitting mounting holes. 4-29
3 Nose Landing Gear axle bearing nut. 4-29
4 Untempered martensite in the Nose Landing Gear. 4-31
5 Upper diagonal strut damage. 4-32
6 Titanium fitting tee cracks. 4-32
7 Emergency egress slide. 4-33
8 Increase in the ET-35 (STS-35) Liquid Hydrogen/Liquid Oxygen 17" 4-34
disconnect flapper tip loads.
9 OV-102 Engine Interface Unit Power-On Reset anomaly. 4-36
10 STS-35/OV-102 Freon Coolant Loop Flow Proportioning Valve 4-37
anomaly.
11 Aluminum rivets installed in the wing assembly without proper heat 4-39
treatment and corrosion protection.
12 External leak on STS-35/OV-102 1/4" Liquid Oxygen flex hose. 4-42
13 Display Unit solder joint investigation. 4-44
14 Ku-band broken lock motor wiring. 4-46
15 Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Generator Valve Module issue. 4-47
16 OV-102 Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve power "on" violation. 4-48
4-3 STS-35 Postflight Edition
SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-35 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/ RISK
SEQ. NO. FACTOR PAGE
ORBITER
17 OV-102 Freon Coolant Loop flow rate degradation. 4-49
18 Wing struts below minimum wall thickness. 4-51
19 OV-102 air lock dents. 4-53
20 Outer ring movement on Preload Indicating washers on Liquid 4-53
Hydrogen Orbiter/Space Shuttle Main Engine interface on OV-103.
21 Main Propulsion System joint weld issue. 4-55
22 Cracks in Auxiliary Power Unit dynatube fittings. 4-56
23 OV-102 20-psi helium regulator leak. 4-58
24 Fuel Cell separator plate plating defects. 4-59
25 Inertial Measurement Unit #2 "power conditioner fail" Built-in Test 4-61
Equipment indication.
26 Gaseous Nitrogen Shutoff Valve weld failure on OV-105. 4-62
27 Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Generator/Fuel Pump heater system "B" 4-64
failed on during STS-41.
28 Liquid Hydrogen prevalve detent cover seal spring. 4-66
29 Tire pressure problem. 4-67
SSME
1 Space Shuttle Main Engine High-Pressure Fuel duct weld proof- 4-68
pressure test failure issue.
2 Titanium High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump inlet defects. 4-68
3 Heat exchanger weld contamination (generic). 4-69
4 Fuel Preburner Liquid Oxygen post fatigue. 4-71
5 Engine #0213 spark igniter potential failure. 4-72
6 Low-Pressure Fuel duct tripod cracks. 4-73
7 Pogo precharge pressure software anomaly. 4-75
8 High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump bearing etching/corrosion issue. 4-76
9 Rigid fuel bleed duct stress corrosion cracking, engine #2029. 4-77
10 High-pressure fuel duct flange radius cracking. 4-79
11 High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump first stage turbine disc cracking. 4-81
12 Preburner fuel duct failed during proof test. 4-82
13 High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump Serial Number #4405R1 liftoff seal 4-83
anomaly during a 10,000-second certification run.
4-4 STS-35 Postflight Edition
SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-35 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/ RISK
SEQ. NO. FACTOR PAGE
SRB
1 Linear Shaped Charge lot acceptance test failures. 4-85
2 Hydraulic system Quick Disconnect spring anomalies. 4-86
3 Solid Rocket Booster hydraulic pump failure during acceptance 4-88
testing.
4 Actuator brackets found cracked during refurbishment of aft skirt. 4-90
5 Improper spotface on Solid Rocket Booster Thrust Vector Control 4-91
Check Valve Filter Assembly and piston accumulators.
6 Solid Rocket Booster electrical cable integrity through the rooster tail. 4-93
SRM
1 STS-35 potential Solid Rocket Motor thrust imbalance. 4-95
2 Putty on inner gasket of test motors. , 4-96
3 STS-31 right Solid Rocket Motor igniter adapter-to-forward dome 4-97
joint putty blowhole.
4 Solid Rocket Motor igniter insulation Factor of Safety issue. 4-98
5 Debris in the Solid Rocket Motor nozzle flex bearing cavity. 4-100
6 Aft dome factory joint internal insulation voids. 4-102
7 Solid Rocket Motor Ignition Initiator leak test. 4-103
8 STS-41 Stat-O-Seal rubber damage. 4-104
El
1 Liquid Hydrogen recirculation line primer debonds. 4-105
2 Foreign object found on ET-35. 4-106
PAYLQAD
1 Broad Band X-Ray Telescope failure could lead to loss of vehicle. 4-107
2 Astro payload support structure/pallet assembly hardpoint lockwire 4-108
issue.
Unrestrained camcorder during STS-35 ascent/descent. 4-111
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This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-38/OV-104 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight. Each anomaly is briefly
described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.




SEQ. NO. FACTOR PAGE
ORBITER
1 Water Spray Boiler #2 did not cool Auxiliary Power Unit lube oil 5-3
while under operation of controller "A".
2 Flash Evaporator System water supply accumulator heater system 5-4
biased low.
3 Auxiliary Power Unit #3 X-axis acceleration trace erratic. 5-5
4 Vacuum cleaner short circuit. 5-6
5 Auxiliary Power Unit Exhaust Gas Temperature instrumentation 5-7
interaction with injector tube temperature instrumentation.
6 Right vent door 1, 2 purge position failure. 5-8
7 Thruster R1U showed low chamber pressure. 5-9
8 Continuous "tire press" Fault Detection and Annunciator message 5-10
following landing gear safing.
9 Transient smoke detector event indication anomaly. 5-11
SRB
1 Unidentified debris observed between Mission Elapsed Time 26 5-12
seconds to 40 seconds from base region of both Solid Rocket
Boosters.
2 Right Solid Rocket Booster External Tank Attachment ring missing 5-14
Instafoam at forward face.
MOD
1 Unexpected General Purpose Computer #3 talkback indication. 5-15
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This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-32/OV-102 mission, the previous flight of the Obiter vehicle. Each anomaly is
briefly described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each anomaly in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.




SEQ. NO. ANOMALY PAGE
ORBITER
1 Auxiliary Power Unit #3 lubrication oil outlet pressure high. 6-4
2 Right-hand Orbital Maneuvering System "no-back" device moved 6-5
during ascent.
3 Gaseous Oxygen Flow Control Valve # 2 opened sluggishly. 6-6
4 Humidity separator "B" water bypass. 6-7
5 Humidity separator "A" water bypass. 6-8
6 Flash Evaporator System topping duct "B" string heater failed. 6-8
7 Inertial Measurement Unit #1 was deselected by Redundancy 6-9
Management due to Y-axis transients.
8 Hydraulic systems #1 and #2 unloader valves exhibited anomalous 6-10
operation,
9 Water Spray Boilers #2 and #3 regulator pressure decaying slowly. 6-11
10 Avionics bay #3A smoke detector transient alarm and associated 6-12
lights.
11 Waste water dump line/nozzle blockage. 6-13
12 Backup Flight Computer General Purpose Computer errors - 6-14
Input/Output terminal B.
13 Water Spray Boiler #3 controller "A" overcooling. 6-16
14 Main Propulsion System Liquid Hydrogen outboard fill and drain 6-16
relief valve leak.
15 Right-hand stop bolt was found slightly deformed on the STS-32 6-17
centering ring of the forward External Tank attach/separation
assembly.
16 Pilot seat down drive motor did not operate. 6-19
SSME
1 Main Combustion Chamber aft end debond found on engine #2022. 6-20
2 Gouges found in the Main Combustion Chamber throat area of 6-21
engines #2024 and #2028.
6-2 STS-35 Postflight Edition
SECTION 6 INDEX - CONTINUED
STS-32 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO. ANOMALY PAGE
1 Upper strut Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer cover partially 6-22
missing.
2 External Tank Attachment ring aft Instrument and Electronics 6-23
Assembly cover sooted.
3 Broken fastener found on STS-32 left-hand SRB upper strut fairing. 6-24
SRM
1 Right Solid Rocket Motor Safe and Arm gasket depression on 6-25
secondary seal.
2 Raised areas found on the igniter inner Gask-O-Seal. 6-26
ET
Review of the External Tank separation photos from STS-32 showed 6-27
4 Spray-On Foam Insulation divots in the bipod area.
1 Right-hand aft Integrated Electronic Assembly bent pins. 6-28
MCC
1 State vector uplink incident. 6-29
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This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-35/OV-102 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are
listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the
anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.




SEQ. NO. FACTOR PAGE
INTEGRATION
1 Backup Flight System software patch for pad B definition of 7-3
longitudinal location was incorrect.
ORBITER
1 Left Reaction Control System drain panel heater "A" was not at 7-4
normal temperature.
2 Degradation of waste water dump function. • 7-5
3 -Z star tracker, Serial Number 006 failed 2 initial self-tests. 7-5
4 Payload Bay Door environmental seal debond. 7-6
5 Water Spray Boiler #3A operation was abnormal during ascent and 7-7
entry.
6 Window W-l has a 0.15" diameter chip. 7-7
7 Water Spray Boiler #2 was subjected to abnormally large quantities 7-7
of wax.
8 Reaction Control System vernier thruster R5D failed "off1. 7-8
9 Orbiter/External Tank Liquid Oxygen aft attach/separation hole 7-8
plugger did not fully extend.
10 Right-hand stop bolt was found bent on the STS-35 centering ring of 7-9
the forward ET attach/separation assembly.
11 Pilot seat down-limit switch failure. 7-10
SRM
Heat-effected Carbon Cloth Phenolic on the left Solid Rocket Motor 7-11
at nozzle joint #3.
External Tank Thermal Protection System divots found at the 7-12
intertank-to-hydrogen flange.
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This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.




AFB Air Force Base
AFD Aft Flight Deck
AMOS Air Force Maui Optical Site
AOA Abort Once Around
AOS Acquisition of Signal
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
AR Accepted Risk
ATP Acceptance Test Procedure
ATT Acceptance Thermal Testing
AVT Acceptance Vibration Testing
BB Barrier-Booster
BBXRT Broad Band X-Ray Telescope
BFC Backup Flight Computer
BFS Backup Right System
BITE Built-in Test Equipment
BOB Breakout Box
BSR Bite Status Register
C Controlled
CA California
CAR Corrective Action Report
CB Circuit Breaker
cc/sec Cubic Centimeters Per Second
CCP Carbon Cloth Phenolic
CDMS Command and Data Management System
CEI Configuration End Item
CG Center of Gravity
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
COAS Crew Optical Alignment Sight
CR Change Request
CRES Corrosion Resistant Steel
Crit Criticality
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
CVFA Check Valve Filter Assembly
CWC Contingency Water Container
A-.l STS-35 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
DAR Deviation Approval Request
DDU Dedicated Display Unit
DM Development Motor
DR Discrepancy Report
DSC Designated Signal Conditioner
DTO Detailed Test Objective
DU Display Unit
EAFB Edwards Air Force Base
EOT Exhaust Gas Temperature
EIU Engine Interface Unit
EPDM Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer
EPDS Electrical Power Distribution System
EST Eastern Standard Time
ET External Tank
ETA External Tank Attachment
F Fahrenheit
FASCO Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
FC Fuel Cell
FCL Freon Coolant Loop
PCS Flight Control System
FCV Flow Control Valve
FD Bight Day
FDA Fault Detection and Annunciator
FEC Field Engineering Change
FES Flash Evaporator System
FID Fault Identification
FMEA/CIL Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
FOS Factor of Safety
FP Fuel Pump
FPB Fuel Preburner
FPM Flow Proportional Module
FPV Flow Proportioning Valve
FRR Flight Readiness Review
FRT Flight Readiness Test
FSP Flight Safety Panel
ft Feet
A-2 STS-35 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
GEI Ground Environment Instrumentation
GFE Government Furnished Equipment
GG Gas Generator
GGVM Gas Generator Valve Module
GH2 Gaseous Hydrogen
GN2 Gaseous Nitrogen
GNCS Guidance, Navigation, and Control System
GO2 Gaseous Oxygen
GOX Gaseous Oxygen
GPC General Purpose Computer
GSE Ground Support Equipment




HGDS Hazardous Gas Detection System
HPF High-Pressure Fuel
HPFTP High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
HPOTP High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
HPV Helium Precharge Valve
HR Hazard Report
hr Hour
HUT Hopkins Ultraviolet Telescope
Hz Hertz
I/O Input/Output
ICD Interface Control Drawing
ID Inside Diameter




IMCS Image Motion Compensation System
IMU Inertia! Measurement Unit
in-lb Inch-Pounds
INCO Integrated Communications Officer
INTO Integration
IOP Input/Output Processor
IPS Instrument Pointing System
IRS Integrated Radiator System
JSC Johnson Space Center
A-3 STS-35 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
K Kelvin
kbit Kilobit
KSC Kennedy Space Center
L-2 Launch Minus 2 Days (Review)
lb Pound
Ib/hr Pounds Per Hour
Ibf Pounds Force
LCC Launch Commit Criteria
LCF Low-Cycle Fatigue





LME Liquid Metal Embrittlement
LO2 Liquid Oxygen
LOS Loss of Signal
LOX Liquid Oxygen
LPF Low-Pressure Fuel
LPFTP Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
LPOTP Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
LPS Launch Process Sequencer
LSC Linear Shaped Charge
LSFR Launch Site Flow Review
MCC Main Combustion Chamber
Mission Control Center
MCF Major Component Failure
ME Main Engine
MECO Main Engine Cutoff
MET Mission Elapsed Time
min Minute
MLG Main Landing Gear
MLJ Multi-Layer Insulation
MLP Mobile Launch Platform
MPE Mission-Peculiar Equipment
MMC Martin Marietta Corporation
MMT Mission Management Team
MOR Manufacturing Operation Record
MPE Mission-Peculiar Equipment
MPS Mam Propulsion System
A-4 STS-35 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
MRB Material Review Board
MS Mission Specialist
MSE Mission Safety Evaluation
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
N2 Nitrogen
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDE Nondestructive Evaluation
NEOM Nominal End-of-Mission
NLG Nose Landing Gear
NSI NASA Standard Initiator
NSLD NASA Shuttle Logistic Depot
NSRS NASA Safety Reporting System
O2 Oxygen
OD Outside Diameter
OFI Operational Flight Instrumentation
OMI Operations and Maintenance Instruction
OMRS Operational Maintenance Requirements Specification
OMRSD Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
OMS Orbital Maneuvering System
OPB Oxidizer Preburner
OPF Orbiter Processing Facility
OPO Orbiter Project Office
ORBI Orbiter
OSMQ Office of Safety and Mission Quality




PAR Prelaunch Assessment Review
PASS Primary Avionics Software System
Pc Chamber Pressure
PCV Pulse Control Valve
PLBD Payload Bay Door
PLI Preload Indicating
FOR Power-On Reset
ppm Parts Per Million
PR Problem Report
PRCB Program Requirements Control Board
PRCBD Program Requirements Control Board Document
PRLA Payload Retention Latch Assembly
A-5 STS-35 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
psi Pounds Per Square Inch
psi/hr Pounds Per Square Inch Per Hour
psia Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
psig Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
PSSA Payload Support Strut Assembly
QD Quick Disconnect
R Rankin
RCN Requirements Change Notice
RCS Reaction Control System
RFCA Radiator Flow Control Assembly




RMS Remote Manipulator System
RPC Remote Power Controller
RSRM Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor





S&A Safe and Arm
SAREX Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment
sees Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Second
scim Standard Cubic Inch Per Minute
sec Second
SEM Scanning Electron Microscope
SII SRM Ignition Initiator
SLA Super-Light Ablator
SODB Shuttle Operational Data Book
SOFI Spray-On Foam Insulation
SOV Shutoff Valve
SR&QA Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SRM Solid Rocket Motor
SSC . Stennis Space Center
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
SSRP System Safety Review Panel
SSV Space Shuttle Vehicle
A-6 STS-35 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
TAL Transatlantic Abort Landing
TAPS Two-Axis Pointing System
TC Thiokol Corporation
TEM Test Evaluation Motor
TPMS ire Pressure Monitoring System
TPS Thermal Protection System
TSM Tail Service Mast
TVC Thrust Vector Control
UHF Ultrahigh Frequency
UTT Ultraviolet Imaging Telescope
USBI United Space Boosters, Inc.
VAB Vehicle Assembly Building
WSB Water Spray Boiler
WUPPE Wisconsin Ultraviolet Photopolarimetry Experiment
A-7 STS-35 Postflight Edition
